{"id":684,"date":"2020-01-10T14:52:22","date_gmt":"2020-01-10T13:52:22","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.noyardstick.com\/?p=684"},"modified":"2020-01-10T14:58:15","modified_gmt":"2020-01-10T13:58:15","slug":"ny-dispatches-2020-plans-and-reality","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.noyardstick.com\/?p=684","title":{"rendered":"NY Dispatches: 2020 – plans and reality"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

According to an old adage, a political analyst is a person who is able to give a coherent prediction of what is going to happen in six months\u2019 time, and also able to explain coherently, in six months\u2019 time, why that prediction failed. But let\u2019s not be cruel to political analysts. Or not only to them, says this political analyst. Other social scientist forecasters also make mistakes \u2013 especially when they are pressured by politicians, are trying to give predictions for several years ahead, or when they are asked to set ambitious targets. Or all three at the same time. Sometimes therefore it makes sense to take a step back and ask if the predictions have come true.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n

Russia adopted an ambitious development strategy in 2008<\/a>. The strategy had been under consideration since 2006, shortly after the monetization of social benefits in 2005 ended Russia\u2019s first love affair with Vladimir Putin. The strategy had to be revised<\/a> in 2012, in light of the global economic crisis, but its goals, set for the year 2020, remained ambitious. In hindsight, perhaps a little too ambitious for the politics that Russia\u2019s leaders chose to conduct in the past decade.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The strategy intended to:<\/p>\n\n\n\n