Pipeline crossroads

Russia watchers, in recent months, have been entangled in the cobweb of carefully concocted crackdown laws and the nervous improvisation of the ruling elite in order to contain the resilient opposition movement. Notwithstanding the importance of the said steps which I discussed in my latest entry, it is important to discuss another story that has been cooking in the recent months and which potentially has outstanding importance when it comes to the policy of opening: the saga around TNK-BP and how the second round of this fight between two important Russian financial circles might end.

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Between a cucumber and a hard place

As the so-called „cucumber season”, or summer political recess is looming upon us, it is appropriate to do a quick recap on where exactly the political situation in Russia is standing for the moment. I quite agree with Brian Whitmore that this summer seems to be nothing but a bit of clear sky before a storm, but there is more than one way this storm might unfold. The response of the authorities is a mixture of consistent steps building on one another and wild improvisation that reflect the incertitude of the elite. The big challange for Vladimir Putin seems to be that he has to play diagonally different games to the elite and to an increasingly split Russian electorate. On the top of it, he seems to have chosen a bad strategy.

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Marsh of millions*

I’ve been neglecting the different forms of opposition activity on this blog for quite a while; therefore the second March of Millions on 12 June seems to be a fine excuse to come back on this important topic. The essential thing is, of course, that the rally was held in an orderly and peaceful manner, unlike the original one a month ago that resulted in violent clashes with the police and risked derailing the process started in December by offering a pretext to the elite to tighten rules on demonstrations. Mind you, they do have tightened rules: Vladimir Putin had signed the new law on rallies increasing dramatically the fines for unsanctioned protests. It is time to enumerate the messages which the state of the opposition movement is sending us.

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Old habits die hard

The first few weeks of Dmitry Medvedev’s government under President Putin have more or less matched expectations. As I have blogged before, the new cabinet is designed to be either the engine of further reforms and a preparation for a gradual generational change, or merely an outpost for the conservatives withdrawn to the safe haven of the Presidential Administration. This clever infographic from RusRep, by the same token, claims an “anti-clan turnaround”. It might be true, when it comes to the government and the clan system formed until Putin I-II in general. However, as a lot of heavyweights (7 former members of the government) are still sitting in an “extended” Presidential Administration with remote controls in their hands (which Medvedev, in a telling move, deemed important to state they don’t have), Medvedev’s government is bound to be a “conflict government” with more than one battlefields.

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Presenting the new team

Dmitry Medvedev has submitted the list of his new government to Vladimir Putin on Tuesday, however, it will not be made public until the beginning of next week – that is, after the end of the G-8 summit in Camp David. This will also allow the Kremlin to come up with some last-minute changes and possibly with some surprise candidates to certain positions. In the last few weeks, press reports gave ample ground for speculation about the new ministers. Let’s see what we’ve got for the time being. Continue reading →

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From referee to politician

Vladimir Putin will start his third, and, quite probably, as many say, last presidential term tomorrow. I’m clearly more inclined, than not, to agree with this statement, but as the last couple of years taught me better, I prefer not to make hot-headed predictions. Still, as I have blogged several times already, the third term of Putin will mark a significantly different era in Russian politics. Not because there are changes going on in Russia, but because it will be Putin, instead of Medvedev, who has to respond to and live with these changes as President. And the main novelty will be the nature of Putin’s role in this new system which will require him to be much more of a political leader than a pivotal player, a technical centerpiece.

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Pros and cons

Vladimir Putin delivered his last big speech as PM in front of Duma deputies yesterday, and it did not go smoothly. Not only did A Just Russia perform a „non-planned” walkout, but towards the end Putin reportedly lost his infamous straight face and even made an intriguing remark stating that at the end of his third term, he will still be fit for two more presidential terms – something that forced his spokesman, Dmitry Peskov to make an awkward explanation. Of course, given how many people – including myself – were sure even in 2011 that Medvedev would stay on for another term, it would be foolish to exclude a possibility that at the moment does look highly improbable. As always, I have my reasons to underpin my arguments, but this time I can also think of some circumstances which – as last year – would be capable to blow my structure of thinking away like a house of cards.

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