What do the protests over livestock culling in Siberia say about the relationship between the Russian state and its citizens? And why is this just one of the many accumulating grievances that the Kremlin is concerned about ahead of this year’s Duma election? And why are they concerned, to begin with? More on these and some assorted news from Russia’s regions that did not make their way into Bear Market Brief over the past month.

Culling protests 

The protests and panic in several Siberian regions, primarily Novosibirsk, over the culling of livestock due to a long unspecified disease outbreak over the past weeks again highlight the complex risk environment that the Russian authorities have navigated themselves into.

Authorities justified the culling, which started in mid-February under a regional emergency decree that was kept secret for a month, by citing outbreaks of rabies and “mutated” pasteurellosis. Public anger was further fueled by suspicions that the cullings may actually have been prompted by an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease, which the authorities officially denied (experts say that the measures taken by the authorities match those usually triggered by a foot-and-mouth outbreak), but which would have seriously complicated food exports, a sector dominated by a handful of large enterprises. Furthermore, many farmers insisted that their animals are healthy and that the authorities provided no diagnostic documents. Another rumor – that the authorities were trying to kill off smaller producers to benefit large agro-conglomerates such as Miratorg – also spread, even though there was no evidence that larger enterprises were protected from the cullings (however, as researcher Ilya Shumanov explained to Meduza, they do have easier access to insurance, essentially a form of support). Analysts estimate direct property damage to farmers across the affected regions at 1.59 billion rubles, with additional losses from broken production cycles totaling nearly 400 million rubles

After farmers in several villages protested, erected roadblocks and recorded appeals to Vladimir Putin, tensions escalated to the deployment of OMON riot control units and to the arrest of several protesters and their supporters, including a veteran of the Chechen War, Ivan Otrakovskiy and Ivan Frolov, a local journalist. A farmer in the village of Chernokurya, Pyotr Polezhayev, made headlines by pouring petrol over himself and threatening self-immolation to stop the killing of his animals. In Kozikha, a local woman with a disabled child said that the authorities threatened her with getting social services involved if she did not stop criticizing the cull on social media. By the end of March, the authorities in the Novosibirsk Region, the epicenter of the protests, broke the resistance of locals as the last family still holding out was forced to give up and allow the culling of their livestock. The campaign continued, however. On March 31, farmers from six regions appealed to Putin and the legislature again to stop unjustified cullings. 

The unrest fits into a wider trend of slowly accumulating smaller-scale domestic political risks – think of anger over utility breakdowns, price hikes or the attempted blocking of Telegram – that in a way all reflect on the same developments: disruptive domestic changes triggered or accelerated by the war, a lack of willingness on behalf of the federal government to allocate budgetary funds to solving domestic problems as opposed to war-related goals and symbolic politics, and a growing communication gap between the authorities and the society. 

The rumors, which started spreading after the exposure of the emergency decree and galvanized protests and sympathizers, converged on the point of suspecting state authorities of aiding large, politically connected business players at the expense of small producers. Even when the evidence is weak, people will often suspect the continuation of trends that they have experienced before: in this case the violent asset redistribution triggered by the war, the bifurcation of several economic sectors to well-connected and heavily supported major players and vulnerable smaller ones (which was the case in the Russian agriculture even before the war), the lavish spending on war-related goals and war participants at the expense of other budgetary goals, etc. The lack of effective communication between the regional government and local residents speaks to the top-down accountability that defines Russia’s flawed federal structure and also highlights the important role of the very municipal authorities and public services that are being eliminated Russia-wide under the Kremlin’s municipal reform (including in the Novosibirsk Region). 

In a telling move, Sverdlovsk governor Denis Pasler reportedly ascribed the outbreak to an ostensible sabotage action that has to do with imported German livestock feed. This is not the first time that regional authorities are pointing at an external enemy to divert anger with domestic policies (for example earlier some regional officials have accused pro-Ukraine saboteurs of starting wildfires). 

The protests have also followed an oft-seen pattern: they remained localized, even though the issue is not; tactics were similar to previous similar protest movements: roadblocks, self-immolation, appeals to Putin. We have seen such tactics utilized by prior protest movements, e.g. during last year’s protests against the municipal reform. To me this says that Russian citizens have built a reliable toolkit over the past years that they think has the best chances to capture the attention of the federal authorities because they understand that it is to the federal government and not them, the voters, that regional authorities are accountable to, that such problems will rarely be resolved locally, and they also understand that the Kremlin is able to put pressure on regional and local governments with relative ease. 

Neither is there anything new in the response of the authorities: a mixture of information blockage, selective repression (including, it seems, by supposedly neutral government agencies) and the promise of material support, which however was deemed woefully insufficient by the protesters, even as a one-time compensation, let alone a suspended support for small farms to relaunch production. 

This is, in part, due to a lack of willingness and ability to spend more money. The Novosibirsk Region, for instance, was in what I’d call a “fiscal danger zone” even at the end of last year, with a deficit hitting almost 20% of its own income, corporate income tax receipts falling by more than 15% relative to 2024 and barely any reserves to speak about. Recently the regional government announced a revision of the region’s 2026 budget, adopted only a couple of months ago, but already facing a ballooning deficit and growing debt. With the initial allocation of 200 million rubles for “operational compensation” likely to grow further, and with the additional social payments further burdening the regional budget, the aftershocks of the outbreak can reach a point where either some other budgetary items will have to be cut to increase payments or the federal government will have to increase transfers from its own reserves. Another question, of course, is whether the payments will actually reach the intended recipients in a timely manner, which we know was not the case recently, with housing certificates for displaced people in the Kursk Region. And this is just one issue in a rapidly deteriorating regional fiscal landscape.  

A curious campaign

It seems unsurprising that as domestic political risks accumulate, the Kremlin is reportedly revising expectations about the September Duma election. At the end of February, the “Senezh” leadership center, linked to the domestic bloc of the Presidential Administration, held an orientation seminar for deputy governors responsible for domestic affairs (including elections). Sergey Kirienko, the deputy head of the Presidential Administration presented three electoral scenarios: an optimistic “Victorious Nation” scenario premised on peace on Moscow’s terms and the subsequent economic boom, a pessimistic “Besieged Fortress” scenario based on a deterioration of Moscow’s war effort, and a baseline “Nation of Heroes” scenario based on the continuation of the war without major shifts. While the existence of the three scenarios suggest that the Presidential Administration still has not discounted the possibility of a turning point in the war in Ukraine in the next 3-4 months (be it a military victory or a political one against an already beleaguered NATO), the realistic expectation is that 2026 will be another lean year, with growing domestic resentment. 

Accordingly, it seems that the Kremlin would now be satisfied with a 50-percent turnout in the election, as opposed to the initially preferred 55, suggesting that it only wants governors to turn out “reliable” pro-government voters using relatively quiet means, instead of intensive campaigning, as high turnout creates unpredictability, especially in cities, and unpredictability in turn increases the need for riskier tactics, such as the outright falsification of the results, which the authorities have used before, but which come with a much higher price than simple manipulation and pressure. Underlining how much the Kremlin fears any domestic instability, deputy governors were reportedly also told that they should keep local conflicts under wraps, and the goal of moving hundreds of war participants – including actual soldiers, not just career civil servants with a safe stint near the frontlines – into elected positions was quietly downgraded. As the Kremlin found out over the past months, they too can create uncertainty if they take their position as genuine representatives of the people and the “new elite” too seriously.

The Kremlin is in an easier situation with legislative elections where the core strategy has always been minimizing political engagement, than with presidential votes, because in a personalist autocracy, a near-universal acclaim always has to be orchestrated for the leader, but not so much for the loyal parliament. It is enough to turn out the right voters and suppress everyone else. Still, the problem is not so much the falling popularity of United Russia (around 30% if one believes the state-owned VTsIOM), but the growing gap between how easy the Kremlin sees the task of engineering a satisfying electoral result in firmly controlled regions vs in problematic ones. Regions in Siberia and the Far East, for example,  are increasingly viewed as problem zones where local triggers (ecological issues, utility network degradation, price rises) will not be drowned out by the standard nationalistic messaging.

What governors are expected to do, however, is unclear. Most regional budgets – including many in problem regions – are facing increasing deficits, with several regions having announced adjustments to their fiscal plans adopted just months earlier. Novosibirsk, mentioned earlier, is just one example: similar cuts are planned or were adopted in the Chelyabinsk Region, the Maritime Territory, the Tula Region and the Saratov Region, with likely more to come. Most regions will not benefit directly from the oil windfall that the Iran War has brought to Russia, since these revenues primarily go to the federal budget, which has been increasingly reluctant to redistribute them in recent years. Some regions have responded to falling revenues by increasing their debt burden. The cost of servicing regional debt rose by a whopping 133 percent in January year-on-year as several regions took out costly loans from the market. Nineteen have made severe cuts to health care expenditures (regions are mainly responsible for the maintenance and building of hospitals, but also, among other things, for bonuses paid to doctors and medics). The adjustments adopted this year mostly concerned capital expenditures and fields such as education. Social payments and war-related payments are largely untouchable, although in the Kemerovo Region, which has been in deep trouble due to the crisis of its dominant coal industry, even these have been trimmed. This leaves little room for pre-election spending, at least at the regional level. There are some signs that the Kremlin is trying to mitigate this problem by developing an early warning system to flag at least the most flagrantly bad cases: the All-Russian Association for the Development of Local Self-Government (VARMSU) told construction minister Irek Faizullin that in future it would collect problems raised by municipal heads every month and route them directly to the Ministry of Construction, bypassing intermediate levels.

The underlying economy of the so-called “adminresurs”, when authorities rely on public officials as well as large enterprises and the local business elite to turn out the vote, is also shakier after several years of steadily eroding property rights, stricter anti-corruption enforcement in the regions as the Kremlin is trying to squeeze more efficiency out of leaner regional finances, and the constant pressure for established elites to make room for returning war participants. The expansion of online voting (expected in around half of Russia’s regions) has reduced the need for the authorities to rely on intermediaries to some extent, but it is not a miracle switch and it has limitations, both technological and political. 

Barring a significant change in federal policy priorities or regional financial means, this means that coercion will likely play a growing role in the election in certain regions – the newest restrictions of digital freedoms are part of this. This itself creates political risks, but the Kremlin likely understands that the localized flare-ups of dissatisfaction are related, even if they are not connected, and prices the risk associated with them higher.

The authorities can still rely on a lack of infrastructure for any solid protest voting strategy. Unlike five years ago, there is no clear “second party” in Russia’s loyal opposition to gather the protest vote, nor is there an organized protest voting strategy akin to what the late Alexey Navalny’s team designed. The security services have targeted more active chapters of systemic opposition parties (e.g. the Communist Party in the Altai Territory) likely to discourage campaigning. The Kremlin’s domestic political bloc may struggle to navigate a campaign without messages that resonate and much money to distribute, but there is barely any alternative to be worried about.

Also-happeneds

• Squaring the transit circle: Due to import restrictions, squeezed regional budgets and better opportunities with private transit companies and the military industrial complex (where wages rapidly grew), regional public transit has been one of the areas hardest hit by Russia’s wartime restrictions. A selection of news from the past month shows the real-life manifestation of these issues. According to official statistics, nearly half of Russia’s current bus fleet is over ten years old and suffering from significant wear and tear, with fleet updates held back by funding shortages. To address this, the governing United Russia party proposed integrating private taxis into municipal transport systems. The head of Buryatia, in turn, suggested that regions divert 20% of traffic fine revenues – roughly 30 billion rubles across the country – directly to transport modernization. Meanwhile, the city of Tomsk is facing critical service failures, a deficit of more than 310 drivers. Tomsk is not alone with this in Russia, over the past years several regions have announced the closure of various transit routes. 
• RZhD going South: Russian Railways reported its first net loss since 2020, totaling 4.4 billion rubles, as cargo volumes have plummeted. The company has accumulated a total debt of nearly $50 billion, forcing the layoff of 6,000 employees from its central apparatus (at the same time, it has also reportedly begun importing technical workers from India to fill specific vacancies, a slight contradiction that many have noted). To stabilize its finances, RZhD has been liquidating major assets, including the historic Rizhsky Station building in Moscow and a luxury skyscraper in Moscow City, a business center in the Russian capital. This is not the first time that RZhD goes through rough times. In the early-to-mid-2010s the company went through a major crisis due to gross mismanagement (described succinctly by Vladimir Gelman in his book “The Politics of Bad Governance in Contemporary Russia”), after which it should have been reformed – but was not. Over the past years the company has again struggled with unused capacities due to ineffective traffic organization and underinvestment in maintenance, and had to cut its overambitious investment program several times in spite of getting lifelines from the federal government. 
• The prosecution of regional officials continued apace over the past month. In one of the most high-profile cases, regarding defensive fortifications in the Kursk Region, former deputy governor Alexey Dedov pleaded guilty to accepting bribes. Dedov also promptly passed the bucket to his former boss, Alexey Smirnov, who in turn pointed at his predecessor, Roman Starovoit as the main bribe-taker. Starovoit has – somewhat conveniently to the two other men – died last year in an apparent suicide. But there have been a slew of other cases. In the Ivanovo Region, two former deputy chairs of the regional government, Irina Ermish and Sergei Zobnin were each sentenced to 10 years in prison for bribery and abuse of office involving state contracts awarded to a construction firm run by Zobnin’s brother-in-law; the former Deputy Governor of the Rostov Region was placed on an international wanted list for bribery; the former deputy governor of the Bryansk Region was sentenced to ten years in jail for corruption; the former construction minister of Dagestan was arrested on charges of abuse of power; the former acting head of the Tambov Region’s digital development department was arrested on suspicion of embezzlement; the health minister of the Krasnodar Territory and the former sports minister of the Lipetsk Region are both suspected of fraud; lastly (to close out this probably non-exhaustive list) a former official of the Saratov regional government was detained on charges of abuse of powe. As I have noted earlier, some of these cases may have been motivated by score-settling, however, it is also wholly plausible that increased law enforcement activity is spurred by the federal authorities’ desire to reduce waste when it comes to regional spending. 
• …and a prominent criminal case ends: a court sentenced Shahin Shikhlinski, the de facto head of the Azerbaijani diaspora in Yekaterinburg, to 22 years in prison in a case related to a murder and an attempted murder in 2001 and 2011, respectively. Five of the Safarov brothers, prominent members of the same diaspora group, also received long prison sentences. The verdict is notable because the initial arrest of the men in June 2025 and the subsequent death in custody of two of the suspects led to an escalation of a tense diplomatic conflict between Azerbaijan and Russia and even led to concerns about a possible move against more high-profile people with Azerbaijani background, such as former Lukoil president Vagit Alekperov. The two governments however appear to have calmed the tensions since, with Azerbaijan’s ambassador in Moscow talking about a “process of normalization” quite recently.
• The execution of the municipal reform has continued, but more regions have announced that they are going to preserve their two-tier system of local public administration, after the scrapping of village councils has led to protests and vocal dissatisfaction in several regions over the past year. As of March, one year after the adoption of the federal reform, only 34 regions have fully transitioned to the single-tier model desired by the Kremlin, while 15 regions have retained the two-tier system in full. The Republic of Bashkortostan, which is considered a problematic region from the Kremlin’s point of view due to its recent history of strong grassroots protests, announced in March that it would preserve the two-tier model with four types of municipal entities: rural and urban settlements, municipal districts, and urban districts. However, the regional government will, like many other regions, strengthen control over appointments: mayors in rural settlements will be elected by local deputies, while in cities and districts candidates will be drawn from a shortlist provided by the governor. The implementation of the reform in some other regions has been slowed down by local opposition, including (as, for example, recently in the Khabarovsk Region), resistance by local councils, or, as in the case of the communist-governed of Khakassia and the Oryol Region, resistance from the governor. Interestingly, Oryol governor Andrey Klychkov justified his decision by citing the need for local village heads during utility emergencies – a priority issue for the Kremlin. In the Tver Region, meanwhile, district deputies who were complaining to the Prosecution about pressure on them by the head of the municipality to sign off on corrupt contracts, also used the opportunity to complain how the understaffing of the district assembly, a consequence of the municipal reform, increased the burden on them. 
• “Veteran correspondents”: as federal lawmakers are now proposing mandatory employment quotas for war veterans in large private companies in order to lessen the burden on the state apparatus, Russia’s regional governments are also trying to invent novel ways to signal to the Kremlin their readiness to participate in the integration and social elevation of returning war participants (the lion’s share of which will likely fall on them anyway). Some regions are coming up with truly bizarre ideas. Over the past month, Bashkortostan enacted a law granting “veterans of military journalism” priority hiring status within state and municipal authorities. This new status, proposed last year, provides benefits comparable to those of a “veteran of labour”, including transportation and utility subsidies. While war bloggers and correspondents, who have criticized the federal government several times over the past years and have consistently urged more hardline nationalist policies than even the ones enacted by the Kremlin, are without a doubt a group that the authorities would like to keep an eye on, it is questionable whether a risk-avoiding Kremlin would like to shower this fundamentally unpredictable bunch with jobs in public authorities. We shall see.