Ten questions

To put an end to my having neglected the blog for the last month, I intend to come up with a longer and thorougher entry. As a preparation, below are ten questions which I think are the most important and appropriate to ask now that we’re nearing 4 December, the first anniversary of the Duma elections. I will try to come up with some kind of answer to at least some of these, but comments, as usual, are welcome.

10 appropriate questions to ask on the anniversary of the Duma elections

  1. Have the past months strengthened, weakened or just changed the nature of Putin’s influence and his role in the system?
  2. When exactly do we arrive to the point where Medvedev must and can be dismissed? Is there already a split in the vertical?
  3. Who will be the next Prime Minister of Russia and what does it mean?
  4. Which groups are the main winners and the biggest losers of the past few months?
  5. Do the current changes have a driving force, a direction, a visible pattern, that is, are they mostly under control or less so?
  6. Are conflicts within the government and conflicts between the Parliament and the Presidential Administration interconnected?
  7. Will there be a second governing party? If not, what will the fate of ONF (All-Russian Popular Front) be? If yes, what will its role be?
  8. Why has the opposition lost its way? What should it do to recover it?
  9. Has the Russian society gotten any closer to its point of explosion this year?
  10.  Will the siloviki be the first to rebel, or will it be the liberals?

The lines are open, ladies and gentlemen. See you soon!

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Immoral foundations

Somehow, the autumn has so far failed us, those who expected seismic changes to happen in Russian politics as a consequence of the local and regional elections and/or the debate on next year’s budget. What we have seen so far caused some disappointment in those who had wanted to see the non-systemic opposition achieve a regional breakthrough. All the more, considering that the system itself has not stopped to rot at all. This continuous and virtually motionless stalemate has yet again prompted Russian media and Russia-watchers alike to try to figure out where the man in the middle, Vladimir Putin is heading. I will argue that what we have seen now are Putin’s first risky steps to distance himself from the system he created. Due to the large number of variables in the equation, though, it won’t be an easy ride. 

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Time is politicking out

Richard Sakwa, one of my favourite Kremlin-watchers recently published a recap of the main events and processes of the past few months in Russia. Undoubtedly, the most important and strongest statement in the paper was that the politicisation of elite competition would eventually be a death blow to Putin’s system of power. I also think that the debates around the 2013 budget are the strongest proof so far that this competition has already become quite politicised. Diverging views on economic policies and state assets have led to the biggest conflict so far between the two branches of the executive, a considerable dispute within the government, as well as the likely emergence of yet another scheme to keep pluralism within the system.

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Falling leaves

The tensest summer of the past decade in Russia is over. September is about to bring back the political battles – within the elite, within the opposition and between these two heterogeneous groups – to full swing. In 2008, it was the autumn that saw succession wars calm down, but in 2012, succession season is just about to begin. Interestingly enough, the prime question of whether and with whom Dmitry Medvedev may be replaced is massively intertwined with questions about the succession of Vladimir Putin.

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Rearranging that team photo

Russian media served a delicious treat to Kremlin-watchers last week. The Minchenko Consulting Group published a report on the “Politburo 2.0”, trying to decipher and to put into context the new setup of the “collective Putin” after the March presidential election. The report names eight top officials and businessmen that collectively take decisions on Russia’s future, and draws up a power map in the different policy areas of the government. The reason why the report is particularly interesting is not that it conveys a lot of new information – it doesn’t – but that it gives a coherent picture and through hinting at the changing agenda of the elite it suggests drawing some important conclusions, which support speculations that Putin might not fulfil his third presidential term after all. 

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Pussy Riot as a symptom – Part 2

In the first part of this post I was trying to point out some of the more immediate political consequences of the Pussy Riot sentence. I joined the interesting discussion started on Mark Galeotti’s blog, In Moscow’s Shadows, an exchange of ideas, which I invite everyone to take a look at. In this second part I will take a more detailed look at the situation and try to put the Pussy Riot trial into context. I will weigh on my point made earlier that although such events help the opposition to some extent, the elite has a comparative advantage when it comes to pushing for changes. Here’s why.

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Pussy Riot as a symptom – Part 1

When the three members of Pussy Riot received their sentences last week, it was both expected and unexpected. Reading the coverage on Twitter it was apparent to me that while the majority had expected the sentence to be, to an extent, harsh, they were nevertheless baffled when the judge actually sentenced the three women to two years in a penal colony. This schizophrenia has been haunting both Russia watchers and, more importantly, the Russian society for some time now. Its persistence, rather than the trial itself is the reason that makes the Pussy Riot case a turning point. Or rather, one of the several events constituting an important turning point. 

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